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A key tenet of the theory of human capital is that investment in skills results in higher productivity.
 The previous literature has estimated the degree of investment in human capital for individuals by
looking at individual wage growth as a proxy for productivity growth.  In this paper, we have both
wage and personal productivity data, and thus are able to measure of the increase in workers' output
with tenure.  The data is from an autoglass company.  Most of production occurs at the individual
level so measures of output are clear.  We find a very steep learning curve in the year on the job: output
is 53 percent higher after one year than it is initially when hired.  These output gains with tenure are
not reflected in equal percentage pay gains: pay profiles are much flatter than output profiles in the
first year and a half on the job.  For these data, using wage profiles significantly underestimates the
amount of investment compared to the gains evident in output-tenure profiles.  The pattern of productivity
rising more rapidly than pay reverses after two years of tenure. Worker selection is also important.
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A key tenet of the theory of human capital is that investment in skills results in higher 
productivity, which is reflected in higher wages.   The theory has spawned an enormous 
literature that estimates wages as a function of the workers’ experience and job tenure.   
Wage increases with tenure (as opposed to general experience) are taken as evidence of 
firm-specific skills.  As other models of wage determination entered the interpretations of 
wage regressions, the literature has produced estimates of the degree of firm-specific 
investment that differ markedly across the different estimation methods and data sets.
1  
However, this literature has no direct evidence of learning on the job.  In this paper, we 
use measures of the increase in workers’ output with tenure as evidence of the degree of 
learning on the job. 
 
Though a segment of the human capital literature is aimed at determining the pattern of 
investment in human capital (general or specific), there are several additional questions 
that are of interest in their own right, and also that contaminate our ability to estimate the 
pure returns to human capital using wage regressions.  The secondary questions are: what 
are the returns to pure search, what are the returns to match quality, and to what degree 
do wage profiles slope upward as a means of inducing higher effort or greater 
investments in firm-specific skills?  The point of using output regressions is that we can 
interpret the increased output with tenure as learning, separating the effects from other 
explanations of wage growth that are not directly related to productivity, especially 
during early years on the job.   
 
Our goal is to use data on the actual output of individuals to estimate the output-tenure 
profile. The data are from Safelite, an autoglass company.  The company has collected 
data on individual output, measured by windshields installed, for each worker over a 
period of as much as 1 ½ years.
2  Here, we use these data to estimate the effects of tenure 
on output, or the learning curve of individual employees. Because we do not have 
information on worker output in other firms, we cannot distinguish between the effect of 
learning on general or firm-specific aspects of productivity.  But we do know that our 
                                                 
1 See Altonji and Williams (2005) for a recent review and updated results.  See also Abraham and Farber 
(1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), Hutchens (1989).   
2 This is the data set used by Lazear (2000) to estimate the effects of piece rate pay on performance.     4
effects are true productivity effects and do not reflect selection.  Selection is important, 
but because we have individual data on productivity over a portion of the career, we can 
distinguish selection effects from learning effects.  Specifically, we can determine the 
amount by which selecting the right employees raises the learning curve of employees.  
Finally, we see how much the wage profile (or the wage-tenure relationship) diverges 
from the output-tenure relationship under two payment regimes – the payment based on 
hourly wages, and the payment based on piece rate pay.   
 
The use of the Safelite data on windshield installation by individuals has both advantages 
and disadvantages.  First, it is only possible to estimate the learning curve of individuals 
when the work is individual, rather than team-based.
3  Second, we must be able to 
measure output.  Given these two objectives, we are confined to data sets in which 
production is a fairly simple process, as in Safelite.  Given such simplicity, the learning 
curves estimated with this data are likely to be steeper and shorter than those that would 
be estimated for data on more complex jobs.  Thus, a drawback of the data is that it is 
surely an underestimate of the returns to skill development across occupations.  And 
given the simplicity of the production function, the incentive pay schemes that 
accompany this production are also likely to be simpler than those for more complex or 
sophisticated skills or jobs.  The primary advantage is that output is well defined and, as a 
result, the effects that are estimated have straightforward interpretations.   
 
We describe the data next, followed by the output regressions.  We then compare the 
output regressions to pay regressions.  And finally, we estimate models in which we can 
assess the degree to which selecting high ability workers affects the learning curve of the 




                                                 
3 In a team based setting, we would aim to estimate the average learning curve of individuals in the team, 
which would also be of interest.  However, given that most teams are composed of individuals of different 
experience or tenure levels, it would be difficult to estimate a true learning curve for a typical team 
member.     5
1.  The Data  
 
The data are on the output and pay of individual workers in the Safelite corporation 
which installs windshields in cars at peoples’ homes and in its retail shops.   
 
Safelite Glass Corporation is located in Columbus, Ohio and at the time was the 
country’s largest installer of automobile glass, a process in which the employee typically 
drives a truck to the customer’s location and installs a new windshield in their car. In 
1994, Safelite, under the direction of CEO, Garen Staglin, and President, John Barlow, 
implemented a new compensation scheme for the autoglass installers.  Until January, 
1994, glass installers were paid an hourly wage rate, which did not vary in any direct way 
with the number of windows that were installed.  During 1994 and 1995, installers were 
shifted from an hourly wage schedule to performance pay—specifically, to a piece rate 
schedule.  Rather than being paid for the number of hours that they worked, installers 
were paid for the number of glass units that they installed.    
 
Staglin and Barlow changed the compensation scheme because they felt that productivity 
was below where it should have been.  Productivity could have been raised by requiring a 
higher minimum level of output under a time rate system.  If all workers had identical 
preferences, this would have worked well.  Given differences in work preferences, a 
uniform increase in required output, coupled with a wage increase, would not be received 
in the same way by all workers.  In particular, the lower- output workers would find this 
more burdensome than the higher output workers.  In order to avoid massive turnover, the 
firm adopted a piece rate schedule, which allowed those who wanted to work more to 
earn more, but also allowed those who would accept lower pay to put forth less effort.  
 
Safelite has a very sophisticated computerized information system, which keeps track of 
how many units of each kind that each installer in the company installs in a given week.  
Safelite provided monthly data.  Since PPP (Performance Pay Plan) was phased in over a 
19-month period, many workers were employed under both regimes.  Thus, data on 
individual output are available for most installers both during the hourly wage period and   6
during the PPP period.  As a result, we can examine workers under either (or both) of the 
two pay regimes. 
 
Our data are for the period of January 1994 through July 1995, during which time the 
firm moved from hourly pay to piece rate pay gradually and randomly.  The piece rate 
plan had a guaranteed minimum pay equal to $11 per hour, but workers were paid about 
$20 per windshield above the minimum pay.  They installed about 3 windshields per day 
on average.  The dataset also contains the workers’ date of hire, and thus their tenure 
level.  The complete dataset contains 29,837 monthly observations on 3,707 workers.  
We reduce the data to 8,527 observations on 1,225 individuals when we follow only 
those who started work after 1994, and thus have complete observations on output from 
their start date.  Variable means are in the appendix. 
 
2.  The Effects of Tenure on Output 
 
Our emphasis is on the estimation of learning curves for employee productivity.  In these 
data, we cannot distinguish between occupational skills or industry skills and firm-
specific skills because our data are only for one company.  In principle, the activity of 
installing windshields is an occupational or industry skill – it can be transferred to other 
firms (Neal, 1995, Shaw, 1987).  The market for these skills is thin (Lazear, 2005), but 
workers do move from one windshield company to another and sometimes back again.  
We do not have data on individual employee’s age or years of experience.  In sum, we 
model learning curves that to a degree combine firm-specific skills and occupational 
skills.
4   
 
The output regression to be estimated is as follows:  
 
                                                 
4 The learning curve literature has typically focused on learning at the plant or firm level (Benkard, 2000; 
Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990), or on wages and productivity for groups of employees (Hellerstein 
and Neumark, 1999, 2004; Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske, 1999; Van Biesebroeck, 2005).     7
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where i=individual, t=month, Xit is a vector of time controls (month and year), αi is 
person-specific ability, and εit is the random error term.  The learning curve implies that 
β1>0.  We also introduce the possibility that learning curves are different (or more rapid) 
under the piece rate pay scheme, and thus that β2>0. 
 
Estimating the fixed effects regression of (1), initially we use only the data when we have 
each individual’s complete record of performance from the time he is hired up to a 
potential of 19 months of data (the mean values of the variables are in the Appendix). As 
a result, the estimates of learning effects are presented initially (and primarily) for the 
initial period on the job. The first regression results are in Appendix Table B. We plot the 
results in Figure 1. 
  
In Figure 1, we follow people over their career profiles with Safelite to see how learning 
varies before and after the piece rate pay plan is introduced.  That is, there are two types 
of people.  The first type is those who are “new entrants to the firm hired under the 
hourly pay regime” and who then may or not stay with the company when the pay regime 
shifts to piece rate pay. The second type is those who are “new entrants to the firm hired 
under piece rate pay” and thus always work under the piece rate pay regime while at the 
firm. Figure 1 is based on the fixed effects output regression of Appendix Table A2   
 
The primary finding is that learning is pronounced.  For workers hired under the original 
hourly pay plan, during their first month of tenure, workers are 42% less productive than 
they will be one year later. For workers hired under the piece rate plan, workers start at 
higher productivity levels and are 36% less productive in their first month of tenure than 
they are at month 12. In Table 1 below we will estimate a more flexible functional form   8
that divides the sample into pay plan types. We form the remaining tables in the paper 
based on that functional form.
5    
 
It is not surprising that learning is important, especially during the first few months on the 
job, but the fact that it can be documented by detailed measures of output and that it is so 
pronounced is novel.  At least in this simple production process, workers appear to learn 
a great deal during their initial period of employment.  Human capital formation is real.  
Selection effects may be important (as will be seen below), but the effect that we estimate 
here is not a selection effect.  It is the true effect of learning for those workers who 
remain on the job during a given period of time.  Selection is relevant insofar as the 
population on which we estimate the data is not the population of initial employees since 
some leave.  It is best thought of as the learning effect, conditional on remaining with the 
firm.  But our estimates do not suffer from the problem of picking up productivity growth 
that would be seen because the least able workers leave the firm.  That upward bias in the 
learning effect is cleaned out because we estimate our tenure effects by measuring a given 
worker over his work career.  When hourly workers move to the piece rate pay plan, they 
are on average 18 percent more productive (as measured by PieceRate dummy).
6  Thus, 
the stayers under the piece rate were fully skilled prior to the introduction of the piece 
rate, but simply were not exerting as much effort under the hourly pay scheme. 
 
While the steep productivity-tenure profiles are labeled “learning” curves, these learning 
curves could result from increasing effort as well as increasing skills. Piece rate pay 
workers always have higher productivity than hourly paid and a portion of this 
productivity premium is due to greater effort (Lazear, 2000). The steeper productivity-
tenure profiles of the hourly paid could be due to rising effort levels on the first six 
                                                 
5 The fixed effects regressions provide the slopes of these learning curves, but not the initial output levels. 
The starting output levels are the mean values for the data set. New hires under the hourly plan have an 
initial output level (in the first month) of 1.34 windshields, while new hires under the piece rate plan have 
an initial output level of 2.12 windshields. These output levels are very significantly different from each 
other. 
6 This is comparable to that estimated in Lazear (2000).  In the fixed effects estimation, the effect of the 
piece rate plan is estimated off the original hires who change plans, not the new hires under the piece rate.    9
months, not just rising skill levels. Effort could rise as they see that workers who are not 
fired earn much more with tenure at Safelite (see pay regressions below). 
 
3.  Comparing the Wage-Tenure Profile to the Output-Tenure Profile  
 
The effects of tenure on output are typically inferred from the wage-tenure profile.  Thus, 
in this section, we compare the wage-tenure profile to the output-tenure profile.  To focus 
on the different pay regimes, we divide the data into two data sets: one with those 
workers currently paid hourly and hired during the hourly pay regime "(N=2709 worker- 
months); and another of those workers currently paid piece rate but hired under either 
plan (N=5808 worker months). 
 
In the first year, the output gain is 62% for workers under the hourly pay plan (Table1, 
column 5) and 37% for workers under the piece rate pay (Table1, column 7) for a 
weighted average across plans of a 53% output gain. These gains occur in the first twelve 
months on the job.
7     
 
Our results show that the wage-tenure profile does not proxy the output-tenure profile 
very well.  The estimated pay-tenure profile is completely flat under the hourly pay 
scheme (Table 1, fixed effects column 1).  Thus, using a typical payment plan, such as 
hourly pay, if the wage-tenure profile were used to infer the productivity profile, it would 
imply that there is no learning or no performance gain with tenure over the first 19 
months with the firm. In truth, when we measure the output-tenure profile for these 
workers (Table 1, fixed effects column 5) we observe that there is a pronounced gain in 
output with tenure. Thus, in the case of a simple production function such as this, wage-
tenure profiles are considerably flatter than output-tenure profiles, so wages are not a 
good proxy for output in estimating productivity gains from tenure, at least during the 
first few months on the job.  
 
                                                 
7 For all of the regressions of Tables 1 and 2, when the hourly and piece rate samples are combined in one 
regression, F-tests show that the estimated tenure profiles (for output or wages) differ significantly between 
the hourly and piece rate regimes (results available on request).   10
We might expect the wage-tenure profile to be flatter under the hourly pay regime 
because wages would be adjusted infrequently: often wages are adjusted at three or six 
month intervals on a job. It is this very lack of wage adjustment that makes hourly wages 
a poor proxy for productivity. 
 
For workers working under the piece rate scheme, the pay-tenure profile more closely 
reflects the output tenure profile (columns 3 and 7).
8  Any other result would be 
surprising given the payment scheme is piece rate pay, which relates pay directly to 
output.  But note that the pay profile is less steep than the output profile: the piece rate 
plan has a guaranteed minimum pay, which dampens the relation of pay to output. Thus, 
even under piece rate pay, pay gains are a poor proxy for output gains with tenure. And in 
typical jobs, hourly pay is the norm, where profiles are even flatter than with piece rate 
plans.   
 
In sum, if we were to use pay as a proxy for output during the first 19 months on the job, 
we would underestimate the degree of learning on the job.  In a later subsection below, 
when we look at older workers for whom we do not observe the early learning phase of 
employment, we will see that the pay profile becomes steeper than the productivity 
profile at higher tenure levels.   
 
4.  Screening and Self-selection of Workers Based on Ability  
 
These data also provide some evidence that the value to the firm of selecting the right (or 
most productive) workers can be quite high.  In Figure 2, we compare the pay-tenure 
profiles of the fixed effects regressions to OLS regressions.  Selection effects are very 
sizable in the pay-tenure profile of the hourly pay regime with OLS—the estimated OLS 
wage profile is very steep (Table 1, column 2).  Given the completely flat profile of the 
fixed effects estimation for the pay regression, the steepness of the pay-tenure profile 
arises entirely from selection effects.  For any newly hired worker, there is no pay 
                                                 
8 Note that Lazear (2000) shows that piece rate pay is more profitable than hourly pay. In contrast, Freeman 
and Kleiner (2005) show that hourly pay is more profitable in shoe production even though piece rate pay 
is more productive.   11
increase with tenure, but across workers, young workers who are more likely to quit or be 
fired have much lower pay than do long tenure workers within their first year of 
experience with this firm.  There is also a gap between the OLS and fixed effects profiles 
for piece rate paid workers, but it is not as sizable, due probably to better selection under 
piece rates and due to pay that is a function of output.  
 
Similarly, Figure 3 shows that the selection effects are also large in the output-tenure 
profiles for hourly paid workers and for piece-rate paid workers.  As shown in the Figure 
(comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 1), the output-tenure profile is over 50% steeper in 
the OLS regressions in the early years of tenure during the learning phase—a difference 
due entirely to the quitting of poor quality workers who are initially less productive. 
Comparing the profiles for pay (Figure 2) to output (Figure 3), the worst (lowest) paid; 
workers leave rapidly and the higher paid remain as tenure grows. 
 
Overall, we find that the firm is likely to be using two methods to screen or select 
workers.  First, our data shows they are able to sort workers by skills prior to hiring.  We 
conclude this because they do not pay all workers the same starting salary.  The standard 
deviation of starting daily pay for hourly workers is $19.2, given a mean of $70.8; the 
standard deviation of starting pay (in the first month) for piece rate pay is $19.7, given a 
higher mean of $84.7. The comparable productivity mean (standard deviation) of 
windshields per day are 1.75 (1.20) and 2.17 (1.58).
9  Note that under both regimes, 
starting pay varies considerably across new hires, but it varies less than starting 
productivity. However, pay and productivity are highly correlated in the first month: The 
correlation between the starting pay and starting output of workers under the hourly pay 
plan is .44, and under the piece rate plan is .62 (where, of course, the output-pay 
correlation is higher because piece rate pay includes a fixed base and a pay for output 
component).  Thus, the firm can assess skills, and does pay workers differentially for 
skills.  Similarly, during the hourly pay regime they are likely to reject some workers 
lacking potential skills (especially under the hourly pay plan given pay independent of 
                                                 
9 The sample sizes are 688 and 409 new hires under hourly and under piece rate pay. For all workers the 
mean (s.d.) of pay is 78.4 (21.85) (N=2444) and 94.2 (25.9) (N=5658). Comparable productivity measures 
are 2.37 (1.24) and 3.11 (1.41).   12
output, when screening up-front is more important).  The firm does see whether the 
worker has prior windshield installing experience (that we don’t measure), and that may 
account for their ability to sort workers up-front.   
 
Second, the firm is selecting or screening through quits or fires, as when low-performing 
workers self-select out or the firm fires them.  This is obvious because the OLS wage 
profile is much steeper than the fixed effects profile: the poor performers with low 
starting wages leave at much higher rates than the higher paid workers, so there appears 
to be a positive wage profile when there is not (for hourly pay).  The same is true for 
productivity: the poor performers leave and the better performers stay, though the 
selection effects are greater for wages than productivity.   
 
In sum, the firm is using both up-front screening and later sorting to select workers.   A 1  
though the firm is screening up-front for skills, they also appear to be hiring low quality 
workers whose pay exceeds performance relative to high quality: pay and productivity 
are not perfectly correlated across individuals. However, the higher pay-output 
correlation of .62 in the piece rate pay regime suggests pay is closer to performance for 
piece rate pay.
10   The reason the firm does not screen better up-front is likely to be 
twofold: it is difficult to assess skills prior to hiring; and it is easy to fire.  In contrast, if 
we were looking at more skilled jobs, such as computer programmers, we would expect 
to find that the firms spend much more money on the screening process up-front, because 
there is more information on which to screen and because the cost of firing is greater.  
We return later to this selection issue when we look at the quality of leavers. 
 
5.  Paying for the Investments and Earning Rents  
 
The classic model of firm-specific investment always asks the question, does the worker 
and the firm split the costs and returns to firm-specific skills?  In the typical model of 
firm-specific skills, both the worker and firm invest, so the pay profile is flatter than the 
                                                 
10 Note that with hourly pay, the correlation between starting pay and output could be negative even with 
careful sorting of workers: if the high-ability are investing more in skills, their current wage may be higher, 
but their current productivity lower, if the skills are entirely firm specific.     13
output profile: firms pay less than productivity as tenure grows.  However, in an 
alternative incentive pay model, pay may exceed productivity with tenure because firms 
want to attract workers who will increase effort over time or accept the offer for future 
rewards.  Because we have output and pay data, we can test these predictions while 
others have been unable to undertake these tests.   
 
We find evidence supporting both models.  As shown in Figure 4, during the first 19 
months on the job, the pay profile is always flatter than the output profile, as theories of 
firm-specific investment would suggest.  Thus, there could be sharing of investment costs 
and rents.  However, we cannot see the amounts of investments, or the size of the rents 
earned, because we lack two key variables, the alternative wage, and the value of the 
output to the firm.  Therefore, the figures in Figure 4 are drawn so that the pay and output 
profiles are normalized so they overlap (as shown, pay is divided by about 40 in each 
figure).  Within the first nineteen months on the job, the relative flatness of the wage 
profile suggests there may be some splitting of the investments and rents, but lacking 
measures of the value of output or alternative wages we cannot confirm this (Oi, 1962; 
Becker, 1993; Lazear, 2005).
11   
 
However, we also find strong evidence that wages rise faster than productivity as workers 
get considerably older under the hourly pay regime.  In Table 2, the full sample (new 
hires plus older workers of 29,412 worker-months) is used to estimate traditional wage 
tenure profiles and to compare them to output-tenure profiles.  The X variables are years 
of tenure, tenure squared, and tenure-cubed, for comparability to other studies but our 
results are the same if we estimate the model with annual tenure dummies.  By using 
annual measures of tenure, we know we are missing the productivity gains that occur in 
                                                 
11 The wage growth is low in this firm relative to the typical gain to tenure across all occupations (Altonji 
and Williams, 2005). But the results for this low-paying occupation have some broader implications. The 
investment in firm-specific human capital could be considered a cost for the firm of hiring employees, in 
this firm and other firms.  Though the learning curve is short here, the much lower productivity for four 
months can be a sizeable cost for the low-pay high turnover jobs. In the hourly pay regime, the firm appears 
to bear these hiring costs, though we cannot confirm this lacking data on prices and alternative wages. In 
piece rate pay, the position slopes of productivity and pay would suggest there is cost sharing. In any case, 
given sizeable performance gains, we discuss below how the firm might lower their heavy costs of 
investment by sorting  workers more when hiring.   14
the first months of the first year of tenure, but for 73% percent of our sample, we do not 
have monthly starting data.  Therefore, to better fit the model, we add one dummy 
variable for the first year of tenure (Tenure1=1) to show that productivity does have a 
non-linear jump up after the first year of learning.   
 
As shown in Figure 5, output-tenure profiles based on fixed effects regressions show that 
productivity falls over the long run. Output-tenure profiles show that productivity peaks 
in the second year of tenure in both pay regimes, and then falls from 2.9 to 2 windshields 
per day for piece rate workers, and from 2.2 to 1.6 per day for hourly paid workers (see 
Figure 5C, which graphs the fixed effects regressions of Table 2). These fixed effects 
results that look at within-person performance, show that people appear to decrease their 
effort, or have other physical reasons why their productivity declines with tenure.  
 
In contrast, pay-tenure profiles based on fixed effects regressions show that hourly pay 
rises with tenure over the long run, but piece-rate performance pay does decline with 
tenure after about four years (Figure B).  In sum, a steep wage profile is used more in the 
hourly pay regime, where the pay-tenure profile is the only form of incentive pay.  The 
pay profile is less steep in the piece rate plan, where incentives arise daily when pay is a 
function of performance.  This might well be expected in standard models of wage 
policies. 
 
Switching from the fixed effects regressions to OLS regressions, the OLS results for the 
pay-tenure profile for the hourly paid workers, show a very striking rise in pay that peaks 
at tenure year nine (Figure 5D).  These OLS results combine selection with within-person 
wage growth.  The average employee, who is looking at the average pay of people by 
tenure cohort, would surmise that there is a pronounced jump in pay with tenure.  Thus, 
to the extent that pay is an incentive device, his reaction would be much stronger, and 
these OLS regression results may be the relevant results, rather than the fixed effects 
results, for a worker forming expectations of pay increases with tenure.  
 
   15
6.  Selecting Workers with the Potential to Learn on the Job 
 
Firms often state that when they select workers, one feature of ability that they look for is 
the ability to learn.  In jobs with high degrees of firm-specific human capital investment, 
this should be especially true.  Thus, the output regression of (1) should be amended to 
permit the coefficient on Tenure to be individual specific:  
 
(2)  ln(output)it = β0 + β1iTenureit + γXit + αi +  εit 
 
Ability enters through the base-line output, αi, and through the ability to learn, β1i, where 
the i subscript on β1i implies that each person i has their person-specific ability to learn as 
tenure grows.  For simplicity, we dropped piece rate variables  from (2), but in the 
regressions we permit the intercept and tenure coefficient to vary by pay regime.
12  
 
There are reasons why it would be illuminating to estimate what causes individual 
differences in learning curves.  The coefficient on tenure in the regressions above is the 
average return to tenure across ability levels.  It is the “treatment of the treated” effect: 
the average return for this company given selected ability or match quality levels.   
Conditional on the firm’s current selection procedures, the mean tenure coefficient is 
unbiased.  However, if there is significant variation in learning across individuals, it may 
be cost effective for the firm to improve its selection methods and thus increase learning 
curves. 
                                                 
12 The ability to learn, β1i, could be an individual-specific pure ability to learn or could reflect the quality of 
the match between the worker and the firm.  A typical wage-tenure regression would introduce match 
quality in the error term: εit = φij + eit, where φij is a fixed job-specific, j, quality of the match between the 
job and the worker.  Since we have only one job that we observe, we cannot observe match quality.  If the 
learning curve were due to match quality, then correlation ρ(φij, β1i) >0.  If the learning curve is a pure 
person-specific ability to learn, then ρ(φij, β1i) =0.   In our case, with data on only one firm for each person, 
the match quality feeds directly into the person effect, αi and in the fixed effects regressions it neither 
biases the estimated tenure effect nor can it be identified.  For a full discussion of the matching effect in the 
wage-tenure regressions, see Altonji and Williams (2005).  In wage-tenure regressions across firms and 
individuals, the potential bias in the tenure coefficient from omitting the match quality is unsigned.  A 
matching model (or model of ‘experience-good search’) implies that when workers take a job and then 
discover they are poorly suited to the job, they will leave quickly or have short tenure.  In cross-sectional 
data, tenure coefficients pick up a combination of learning and sorting effects.  Those who stay longer are 
not only more skilled as a result of what they have learned, but they also are likely to be better suited to 
their job, which is why they stay on it.   16
 
We can use (2) to estimate how much individual variation there is in the ability to learn.  
Assuming that the coefficient β1i on Tenure is linear, then the first-differenced regression 
is:  
 
(3)  Δln(output)it, t-1 = β1i (Tenureit – Tenurei,t-1) + γ(Xit  - Xit-1) + (εit - εit-1)    
 
It is probably reasonable to assume β1i on Tenure is linear in the first six months on the 
job.  Because (Tenuret - Tenuret-1)=1 for monthly increases in tenure, (3) becomes 
 
(4)  Δln(output)it, t-1 = β1i  + γ(Xit  - Xit-1) + (εit - εit-1)    
 
The first-differences regression (4) is estimated with fixed effects for the subsamples of 
workers with the first five months under the hourly pay regime or under the piece rate 
pay regime, where we lose all individuals with tenure of only one month.
13   
 
There are very significant differences in individual learning curves for windshield 
production.  In this regression, the fixed effects, β1i, in the output growth regression of (4) 
contribute an additional 23 percentage points to the R-squared across all payment regimes 
(regression is not shown).  
 
To put this in perspective, when we estimated the regressions earlier with fixed effects in 
the level of output and pay, we found that the omitted person-specific effects explain 
55% of the variance in the hourly regime and 63% in the piece rate regime (Table 1).  
Thus, individual differences in learning could be a sizable portion of individual 
differences in pay levels.   
                                                 
13 The regression can also be estimated in long differences, in which we difference (2) over the interval t-k 
to t, where k is a lag of up to five months, and then divide by k so that tenure is differenced out and the 
dependent variable is the average monthly growth in output: Δln(output)it, t-k /k = β1i + γ(Xit - Xit-k)/k +  (εit - 
εit-k)/k.   
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Given these sizable individual-specific differences in learning, the firm may have 
significant gains to sorting workers on their ability to learn.  We examine this potential by 
hypothesizing that there are two types of workers: stayers and leavers.  We define the 
leavers as those who work less than six months at the firm.
14  In the output regressions of 
Table 3 a dummy variable for “leaver” is interacted with the tenure variables for the first 
five months of tenure (since leavers stay five months or less).  The tenure*leaver 
interactions show that leavers learn at a significantly lower rate: the output-tenure profiles 
are flatter.  These results are displayed in Figure 6, which graphs the predicted output-
tenure profile for stayers under piece rate pay versus leavers.  Leavers have lower starting 
productivity and somewhat lower rates of learning.   
 
Given that the mean output and growth of output is lower for leavers than stayers, should 
managers do a better job of evaluating potential employees to exclude the potential 
leavers?  If wages were equal to output and fixed hiring costs were low, there would be 
no reason for firms to screen carefully – firms would fire instead of screening new hires.  
Do leavers earn less than stayers?  Table 4 contains the pay regressions that are 
comparable to the Table 3 output regressions.  Leavers do not have lower growth rates of 
pay than stayers (in the fixed effects).  We know leavers have lower starting pay.   
However, the starting pay of leavers is only 6% below that of stayers, but their output is 
37% below in the first month in the hourly pay regime.   
  
Thus, workers who leave within six months earn a much higher starting pay than their 
performance warrants compared to stayers. These results suggest that firms are doing 
some initial sorting based on potential performance, but that leavers are costly relative to 
stayers.  Of course, the hiring of leavers and the high relative pay of leavers is optimal if 
the costs of screening for ability are high.   Managers are weighing the costs of screening 
more carefully to avoid hiring “leavers” versus the costs of higher pay and the use of 
quits or layoffs to remove the low performing “leavers” after they are hired.  
 
 
                                                 
14 Those with six months of tenure at the end of the data set are dropped from this sample.     18
7.  Conclusion   
 
On a simple job such as windshield installation, there is a very steep learning curve in the 
first year on the job: output is 53 percent higher after one year than it is initially.  Our 
data show that these output gains with tenure are not reflected in equal percentage pay 
gains with tenure.  During the hourly wage pay regime, there is no pay gain with tenure 
in the first 19 months on the job, and in the piece rate regime, the gain is modest relative 
to the output gain.  Wage-tenure profiles are much flatter than output-tenure profiles 
during the initial year and one half on the job.  The most important point is that these data 
reveal that wages profiles are not good proxies for output profiles.  Using wage profiles 
significantly underestimates the amount of learning compared to the gains evident in 
output-tenure profiles.   
 
For older workers, after the first two years of tenure, productivity declines with increased 
years of tenure. It would appear that “learning” on the job decreases. But since the type of 
work does not change, productivity depreciates either because workers skills depreciate 
with age, or effort declines. The slope of the pay-tenure profile matches the productivity-
tenure profile for piece rate workers; both pay and productivity decline at high tenure. 
For hourly paid workers, pay rises at higher tenure we have no direct evidence to 
distinguish between deterioration of skills and effort, but think declining effort is the 
most likely explanation. It seems implausible that skills would decline so quickly. 
Boredom is a more reasonable explanatory factor. 
 
The firm is using both up-front screening and later sorting to select workers. They screen 
for quality and pay accordingly. Starting wages and productivity are highly correlated. 
However, in theory, there is likely to be a tradeoff for firms facing expenditures on 
selecting workers: firms that have high turnover rates (due to firing or quits) are probably 
spending less up-front on careful hiring. We find evidence of this tradeoff in this firm. 
The output gains from weeding out lower quality workers in the first months on the job 
are very substantial: the fixed effects regressions have considerably flatter output-tenure 
and pay-tenure profiles than do the OLS regressions. The steeper OLS profiles show that   19
firms are learning about ability and weeding out the less able, instead of hiring carefully 
up-front.
15 We confirm the importance of person fixed effects by looking at the quality of 
“leavers,” who leave the job in less than six months, versus stayers. The leavers are lower 
quality workers than stayers. The leavers have lower starting output and lower growth of 
output on the job than stayers. The leavers also have lower starting pay and lower growth 
of pay, but the pay gap between leavers and stayers is much less than the output gap: 
leavers are costly relative to stayers. Should the firm pay more up-front to sort employees 
and avoid hiring the costly leavers? Given how much weeding out there is of workers 
after they are hired, the firm appears to find it more cost effective to spend less on up-
front screening. However, in more skilled occupations where the costs of firing or 
quitting are greater, it may be cost-effective to spend more on hiring costs.  Thus, when 
they are hired, the firm does sort leavers and stayers and pays leavers less, but it appears 
to be the case that this firm is hiring costly leavers because it is cheaper to screen them 
out later rather than screening them out during hiring.  Instead, the firm hires workers 
across a broad spectrum of basic ability levels and those who don’t perform are more 






                                                 
15 We refer to the learning curve here as learning and skills. But learning models often refer to the firm or 
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 Figure 3: Predicted Output-Tenure Profiles for New Hires (based on Table 1)   25
























































Figure 4: Comparing Predicted Output and Pay Profiles for New Hires (based on Table 1)   26



















































Figure 5: Comparing Predicted Output and Pay Profiles for Workers of All Ages (based on Table 2)  27
 
 
Figure 6: Predicted Output for Stayers Versus Leavers (Hourly Pay Plan)   28
Table 1
ln(Daily Pay) Regressions ln(Output) Regressions





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE  OLS  FE OLS FE OLS  FE  OLS
Tenure  tenure1 = 1 0.056 -0.570 (dropped) (dropped) -0.964 -1.580 (dropped)  (dropped)
dummies for (0.66) (-11.43) (dropped) (dropped) (-2.66) (-11.40) (dropped)  (dropped)
those hired  tenure2 = 1 0.109 -0.477 -0.120 -0.278 -0.667 -1.182 -0.624 -0.626
under hourly  (1.36) (-9.53) (-3.96) (-11.71) (-1.97) (-8.50) (-7.54) (-9.39)
pay.*  tenure3 = 1 0.094 -0.456 -0.098 -0.248 -0.579 -1.029 -0.374 -0.276
(1.27) (-8.98) (-3.65) (-13.88) (-1.85) (-7.30) (-5.13) (-5.52)
tenure4 = 1 0.079 -0.426 -0.087 -0.244 -0.529 -0.933 -0.219 -0.185
(1.14) (-8.25) (-3.61) (-15.62) (-1.82) (-6.50) (-3.32) (-4.22)
tenure5 = 1 0.073 -0.388 -0.076 -0.218 -0.477 -0.808 -0.160 -0.153
(1.15) (-7.37) (-3.46) (-14.66) (-1.78) (-5.53) (-2.67) (-3.68)
tenure6 = 1 0.059 -0.365 -0.071 -0.201 -0.432 -0.768 -0.117 -0.114
(1.02) (-6.74) (-3.58) (-14.10) (-1.76) (-5.11) (-2.17) (-2.84)
tenure7 = 1 0.031 -0.338 -0.055 -0.172 -0.363 -0.622 -0.088 -0.069
(0.60) (-5.97) (-3.09) (-12.11) (-1.62) (-3.95) (-1.81) (-1.72)
tenure8 = 1 0.035 -0.283 -0.048 -0.157 -0.431 -0.666 -0.102 -0.100
(0.72) (-4.73) (-3.05) (-11.07) (-2.13) (-4.01) (-2.36) (-2.51)
tenure9 = 1 0.027 -0.266 -0.054 -0.140 -0.323 -0.487 -0.058 -0.051
(0.61) (-4.13) (-3.80) (-9.73) (-1.75) (-2.72) (-1.50) (-1.26)
tenure10 = 1 -0.007 -0.232 -0.041 -0.117 -0.234 -0.258 -0.061 -0.055
(-0.16) (-3.21) (-3.22) (-8.03) (-1.35) (-1.28) (-1.78) (-1.36)
tenure11 = 1 0.041 -0.147 -0.022 -0.079 -0.299 -0.384 -0.034 -0.034
(1.04) (-1.81) (-1.98) (-5.40) (-1.80) (-1.70) (-1.12) (-0.82)
tenure12 = 1 0.029 -0.157 -0.035 -0.081 -0.148 -0.318 -0.019 -0.026
(0.79) (-1.83) (-3.48) (-5.34) (-0.95) (-1.33) (-0.69) (-0.61)
Tenure  tenure1 = 1 -0.076 -0.234 -0.478 -0.762
dummies for (-3.31) (-18.20) (-7.62) (-21.16)
those hired  tenure2 = 1 -0.058 -0.184 -0.184 -0.305
under piece (-2.75) (-13.69) (-3.18) (-8.10)
rate pay.** tenure3 = 1 -0.052 -0.159 -0.142 -0.246
(-2.69) (-11.24) (-2.66) (-6.20)
tenure4 = 1 -0.037 -0.122 -0.101 -0.170
(-2.04) (-7.86) (-2.05) (-3.90)
tenure5 = 1 -0.036 -0.113 -0.053 -0.084
(-2.13) (-6.79) (-1.15) (-1.80)
tenure6 = 1 -0.039 -0.099 -0.013 -0.029
(-2.45) (-5.50) (-0.30) (-0.57)
tenure7 = 1 -0.020 -0.076 -0.060 -0.071
(-1.26) (-3.72) (-1.41) (-1.25)
tenure8 = 1 -0.014 -0.040 -0.076 -0.058
(-0.90) (-1.75) (-1.76) (-0.90)
_constant  4.382 4.735 4.542 4.652 1.115 1.510  1.073 1.105
(92.25) (80.8) (258.34) (352.85) (5.56) (9.27) (22.36) (29.91)
Number of obs 2711 2711 5816 5816 2709 2709  5808 5808
Adj R-squared 0.882 0.114 0.734 0.142 0.752 0.198  0.740 0.115
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Regression also contains month and year dummies.
*In columns 1 and 2, and 5 and 6, the tenure dummies are months of tenure for the sample currently working under the old hourly pay regime and currently paid hourly pay.  In 
columns   3 and 4, and 7 and 8, the dummies are months of tenure for those hired under houly pay but currently working under the piece rate pay.  **These are tenure dummies for those 
hired   under the piece rate pay and currently working under piece rate. 
This table estimates regressions based on subsamples of new hires given based on their current  pay regime in each column
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These regressions use the entire sample of both new hires and older workers, and the 
regression in each column is the subsample based on the pay regime under which each person 
is currently working. 
t-statistics in parentheses.  Tenure is years of tenure; Tenure
2 and Tenure
3 are the squared and 
cubed terms.  The first row is a dummy variable for first year of tenure with the firm.
Table 2: Regressions for All Workers
ln(daily output) ln(daily pay) 
Hourly Pay  Piece Rate Pay  Hourly Pay  Piece Rate Pay
FE  OLS  FE  FE OLS FE OLS FE  FE OLS
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tenure first year 
 
-0.124 -0.215  -0.063 -0.050 -0.136 -0.008 -0.131 -0.025 -0.025 -0.103
(-3.61)  (-7.64) (-3.33)  (-2.15) (-6.99) (-0.72) (-15.98) (-3.02)  (-2.50) (-14.71)
Tenure  -0.124 -0.077  -0.075 -0.053 -0.037 0.031 0.055 0.010  0.010 0.055
(-3.52)  (-6.35) (-4.36)  (-1.96) (-4.00) (2.72) (15.70) (1.31)  (0.83) (16.59)
Tenure 
2  0.009 0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0016 -0.002 -0.003
(2.46) (5.44)  (2.28)  (-0.19) (2.71) (-2.78) (-8.41) (-3.31)  (-1.15) (-9.95)
Tenure 
3  -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(-2.10)  (-5.59) (1.05) (-2.80) (2.98) (6.27) (-0.01) (7.58)
Constant 1.010 0.873 1.198 1.162 1.089 4.629 4.564 4.678  4.678 4.548
(10.32) (13.82) (22.29)  (9.94) (35.41) (146.47) (248.07) (197.3)  (166.88) (407.60)
R 
2  0.7927 0.0299 0.7660 0.7658 0.0175 0.8181 0.3075 0.7320 0.7318 0.2398
N  12839 12839  16573  16573 16573 12389 12389 16573 16573 16573  30
 
These two regressions are for the subsample of all workers newly hired by the firm. 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Regression also contains month and year dummies. Dependent variable is ln(daily output). 
The tenure dummies are months of tenure. A “leaver” is a worker who stays less than 6 
months: the columns labeled “leavers” are introducing four additional dummy variables for the 
tenure of leavers, so leavers full tenure effect is the sum of the coefficients for “everyone” and 
leavers. Regressions also contain six dummy variables for shifts in the return to tenure after 
piece rate pay for stages: None are significant.
Regression 1 - Fixed Effects Regression 2 - OLS 
Hired Under Hourly Pay Hired Under Piece Rate Pay Hired Under Hourly Pay Hired Under Piece Rate Pay
Everyone Leavers Everyone Leavers Everyone Leavers Everyone Leavers
PieceRatePay = 1  0.157  0.076  0.109 -0.128
(6.77) (1.04) (3.80) (-1.41)
tenure1 = 1 -0.535 0.260  -0.424 0.211 -0.944 -0.368 -0.552 -0.720
(-7.72) (2.71) (-8.10) (2.30) (-15.30) (-7.69) (-7.81) (-10.17)
tenure2 = 1 -0.269 0.188  -0.149 0.202 -0.646 -0.299 -0.262 -0.355
(-4.15) (2.02) (-3.03) (2.20) (-10.55) (-5.58) (-3.73) (-4.38)
tenure3 = 1 -0.157 0.111  -0.064 0.075 -0.504 -0.201 -0.162 -0.420
(-2.62) (1.23) (-1.39) (0.79) (-8.26) (-3.07) (-2.33) (-4.44)
tenure4 = 1 -0.082 0.079  -0.040 -0.397 -0.239 -0.185
(-1.49) (0.89) (-0.94) (-6.48) (-2.90) (-2.77)
tenure5 = 1 -0.050 0.012 -0.330 -0.228 -0.053
(-0.98) (0.30) (-5.38) (-1.91) (-0.78)
tenure6 = 1 -0.031 0.036 -0.302 (dropped)
(-0.67) (0.90) (-4.90) (dropped)
tenure7 = 1 0.003  -0.226
(0.07) (-3.60)
tenure8 = 1 -0.044 -0.247
(-1.10) (-3.88)
tenure9 = 1 -0.016 -0.184
(-0.42) (-2.85)
tenure10 = 1 -0.029 -0.165
(-0.84) (-2.52)
tenure11 = 1 -0.019 -0.098
(-0.62) (-2.23)
tenure12 = 1 -0.008 -0.117
(-0.28) (-1.75)
Number of obs 8048  8048
Adj R-squared 0.689  0.201
Table 3: ln(output) Regressions with  separate “Leaver” Coefficients for  Exiting Workers (New Hires only)  31
 
These two regressions are for the subsample of all workers newly hired by the firm. 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Regression also contains month and year dummies. Dependent variable is ln(daily output). 
The tenure dummies are months of tenure. A “leaver” is a worker who stays less than 6 
months: the columns labeled “leavers” are introducing four additional dummy variables for the 
tenure of leavers, so leavers full tenure effect is the sum of the coefficients for “everyone” and 
leavers. Regressions also contain six dummy variables for shifts in the return to tenure after 
piece rate pay for stages: None are significant.
Regression 1 - Fixed Effects Regression 2 - OLS 
Hired Under Hourly Pay Hired Under Piece Rate Pay Hired Under Hourly Pay Hired Under Piece Rate Pay
Everyone Leavers Everyone Leavers Everyone Leavers Everyone Leavers
PieceRatePay = 1  0.069  -0.025 0.047 0.036
(9.32) (-1.06) (4.50) (1.07)
tenure1 = 1 -0.160 0.022  -0.091 0.041 -0.344 -0.062 -0.128 -0.081
(-7.19) (0.73) (-5.40) (1.39) (-15.21) (-3.54) (-4.94) (-3.12)
tenure2 = 1 -0.101 0.032  -0.052 0.015 -0.265 -0.033 -0.081 -0.062
(-4.87) (1.08) (-3.33) (0.50) (-11.83) (-1.67) (-3.14) (-2.11)
tenure3 = 1 -0.098 0.019  -0.038 -0.014 -0.244 -0.051 -0.051 -0.063
(-5.10) (0.66) (-2.58) (-0.46) (-10.89) (-2.11) (-1.99) (-1.81)
tenure4 = 1 -0.099 0.033  -0.029 -0.225 -0.068 -0.034
(-5.60) (1.16) (-2.13) (-10.04) (-2.26) (-1.40)
tenure5 = 1 -0.087 (dropped) -0.032 -0.195 -0.085 -0.024
(-5.29) (dropped) (-2.44) (-8.66) (-1.94) (-0.96)
tenure6 = 1 -0.085 -0.030 -0.175 (dropped)
(-5.71) (-2.38) (-7.74) (dropped)
tenure7 = 1 -0.077 -0.148
(-5.58) (-6.44)
tenure8 = 1 -0.065 -0.124
(-5.07) (-5.32)
tenure9 = 1 -0.067 -0.106
(-5.70) (-4.48)
tenure10 = 1 -0.056 -0.082
(-5.18) (-3.45)
tenure11 = 1 -0.032 -0.087
(-3.15) (-5.39)
tenure12 = 1 -0.038 -0.034
(-3.93) (-1.40)
Number of obs 8048  8048
Adj R-squared 0.689  0.227
Table 4:  ln(daily pay) Regressions with  separate “Leaver” Cofficients for  Exiting Workers (New Hires only)  32
 
 
Appendix Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
output 2.888 1.396 0.010 14.580
ln(output) 0.895 0.696 -4.605 2.680
daily pay 89.288 25.722 11.500 866.187
ln(daily pay)  4.458 0.255 2.442 6.764
hired with piece rate  0.246 0.430 0.000 1.000
switch to piece rate  0.436 0.496 0.000 1.000
tenure1=1 dummy  0.139 0.346 0.000 1.000
tenure2=1 0.123 0.328 0.000  1.000
tenure3=1 0.108 0.310 0.000  1.000
tenure4=1 0.094 0.292 0.000  1.000
tenure5=1 0.083 0.276 0.000  1.000
tenure6=1 0.074 0.262 0.000  1.000
tenure7=1 0.063 0.243 0.000  1.000
tenure8=1 0.056 0.229 0.000  1.000
tenure9=1 0.049 0.216 0.000  1.000
tenure10=1 0.043 0.203 0.000  1.000
tenure11=1 0.038 0.192 0.000  1.000
tenure12=1 0.034 0.180 0.000  1.000
tenure1=1 for hired under piece rate 0.049 0.216 0.000 1.000
tenure2=1 for hired under piece rate 0.041 0.199 0.000 1.000
tenure3=1 for hired under piece rate 0.035 0.183 0.000 1.000
tenure4=1 for hired under piece rate 0.027 0.163 0.000 1.000
tenure5=1 for hired under piece rate 0.023 0.149 0.000 1.000
tenure6=1 for hired under piece rate 0.019 0.135 0.000 1.000
tenure7=1 for hired under piece rate 0.014 0.117 0.000 1.000
tenure8=1 for hired under piece rate 0.011 0.102 0.000 1.000
leaver with less than 6 months final tenure 0.128 0.334 0.000 1.000
tenure1=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.090 0.286 0.000 1.000
tenure2=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.082 0.274 0.000 1.000
tenure3=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.073 0.260 0.000 1.000
tenure4=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.067 0.249 0.000 1.000
tenure5=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000
tenure6=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.055 0.229 0.000 1.000
tenure7=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.049 0.216 0.000 1.000
tenure8=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.045 0.207 0.000 1.000
tenure9=1 for hired under hourly pay plan 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000
tenure10=1 for hired under hourly pay plan0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000
tenure11=1 for hired under hourly pay plan0.034 0.181 0.000 1.000
tenure12=1 for hired under hourly pay plan0.030 0.172 0.000 1.000  33
 






PieceRatePay = 1 0.185 
(8.40)
tenure1 = 1 -0.547 -0.435
(-7.88) (-8.83)
tenure2 = 1 -0.278 -0.138
(-4.31) (-3.01)
tenure3 = 1 -0.166 -0.095
(-2.77) (-2.20)
tenure4 = 1 -0.094 -0.053
(-1.69) (-1.28)
tenure5 = 1 -0.063 -0.007
(-1.23) (-0.17)
tenure6 = 1 -0.049 0.028
(-1.03) (0.71)
tenure7 = 1 -0.013
(-0.29)
tenure8 = 1 -0.057
(-1.42)
tenure9 = 1 -0.025
(-0.68)
tenure10 = 1 -0.037
(-1.09)
tenure11 = 1 -0.026
(-0.79)
tenure12 = 1 -0.012
(-0.39)
Constant  0.841 
(6.80)
Number of obs 8527
Adj R-squared 0.685 
This is one regression using  the subsample of all new hires only, 
and permits the tenure profile to differ for those hired under
hourly pay (Column 1) versus hired under piece rate pay
(Column 2). 
Regression also contains month and year dummies. 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is ln(daily output).
In column 1, the tenure dummies are months of tenure for the
sample hired under the old hourly pay regime; in column 2 the 
dummies are months of tenure hired under the piece rate pay. 
Column 1 also contains six dummy variables for shifts in the 
returns to tenure after piece rate pay: none are significant